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U.S. Response to the Canadian Industrial 
Disputes Investigation Act 
Bruno Ramirez 
The author analyses the impact that the Canadian In-
dustrial Disputes Investigation Act of 1907 had in the U.S. 
His article also tries to show the extent to which the question 
of arbitration tended to transcend the narrow boundaries of 
industrial relations practice and acquire a wider political sig-
nificance. 
Among the many questions the Progressive movement grappled with 
and left unresolved, one stands out both for its complexity and for the 
pivotai importance it took on throughout the Progressive Era. This was 
the problem of the conflict between labour and capital, not so much in 
the rather abstract sensé of the irreconcilability of the interests of two 
social classes, but rather in terms of the concrète institutional framework 
which was needed to contain that conflict and bring it under social control. 
Central to this problem was the question of arbitration of industrial 
disputes, especially when arbitration involved the intervention of a third 
party whose décision would hâve a determining weight on the resuit of the 
dispute, and more importantly, when this third party was the government. 
Under what circumstances and on what basis should this intervention 
become necessary ? Should the government intervene on an advisory basis 
leaving the final décision to the two disputing parties, or should the govern-
ment use its power to compel the parties to reach a seulement, thereby 
bringing the dispute to an end ? In an era of rapid économie transform-
ations in which the traditional relations of power between capital and labor 
were subject to constant changes, and in which the State's positive rôle 
was making major strides, it is not difficult to see how the question of 
arbitration tended to transcend the narrow boundaries of industrial relations 
practice and acquire a wider political 
significance. RAMIREZ, B., Department of His-
tory, University of Toronto, Toronto, 
Ontario. 
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It is in this context that the Canadian Industrial Disputes Inves-
tigation Act (IDI) of 1907 is of particular historical importance for the 
US situation, for the reactions it generated in US industrial and progressive 
quarters sheds much light on the limitations of the progressive movement 
in coming to grips with this problem, and ultimately, contributes to a 
deepening of our understanding of the progressive movement itself. More-
over, it gives us a particular vantage point which makes it possible to 
enlarge the basis for more comparative studies of the industrial and labour 
expériences of the two countries during the Progressive Era. 
THE DEBATE AROUND THE NEW ZEALAND ARBITRATION ACT 
The debate over arbitration had its first major impetus during the 
prosperity years which followed the severe 1893-96 dépression. The 
rapid growth of unionism which characterized those years was accom-
panied not only by a remarkable spread of trade agreements in various 
industrial sectors and trades, but also by a high level of industrial conflict 
which in the minds of many industrialists posed a serious threat to the 
productive upswing the economy was undergoing1. If the trade agreement, 
with its corollary of conciliation and voluntary arbitration, was having 
some effect in reducing the level of industrial warfare, its limitations in 
insuring industrial peace had become quite apparent, especially in those 
cases where one of the two parties (or both) refused to refer the issue 
of the dispute to arbitration. Moreover, one of the basic assumptions 
underlying the trade agreement System — as it had been elaborated and 
publicized by labour spokesmen and by progressive organizations such 
as the National Civic Fédération (NCF) — was that no compulsion of 
any sort would be resorted to in the process of settling a dispute. 
Coupled with this limitation of the trade agreement, was the wide-
spread publicity that the New Zealand Arbitration Act began to enjoy 
in the USA around the turn of the century. This Act was the first instance 
in which arbitration was made compulsory and binding for the two 
parties to a dispute2. Despite the immédiate opposition from organized 
labour and from many employers, the compulsory arbitration feature 
1
 U.S. Bureau of Labor, Twenty-First Annual Report of the Commissiner of 
Labor, 1906 ; Strikes and Lockouts, (Washington D.C., 1907). Cf. also, Marcus A. 
Hanna, « Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration », Annals of the American Aca-
demy of Political and Social Science, XX (July, 1902), pp. 29-34. 
2 Victor S. CLARK, « Labor Conditions in New Zealand », U.S. Bureau of 
Labor, Bulletin No. 49, Nov. 1903, pp. 1142-1281. 
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of the New Zealand Act aroused the interest of many progressive figures 
and politicians. William Holt, the famous New York publisher and editor, 
was enthusiastic with the Act and gave it widespread publicity through 
his newspaper network. Great enthusiasm and unqualified support came 
also from Henry D. Lloyd, who had visited New Zealand and had observed 
carefully the opération of that new experiment in industrial relations. 
Upon his return to the United States, Lloyd published his book A Coun-
try Without Strikes, in which he elucidated the features of the arbitration 
législation, and concluded that the Act pointed the way toward the goal 
of industrial peace 3. Even US labour leaders admitted that the New Zea-
land Act had proved quite bénéficiai to the labour and industrieil com-
munity of that country. One such leader was United Mine Workers prés-
ident John Mitchell who in his influential book Organized Labor sub-
jected the Act to a lenghty analysis. If on the one hand Mitchell concluded 
that a similar Act could not be applicable to the US given that country's 
différent socio-political and geographical conditions, on the other hand 
he did not exclude that there were particular instances — such as public 
utilities industries and railroads engaged in inter-state traffic —« . . . in 
which compulsion might possibly prove bénéficiai ». 4 The interest showed 
toward the Act by US politicians was remarkable and it became évident 
on occasion of Mr. Lusk's visit to the United States. Congressmen and 
members of several State législatures had the opportunity of heaiing the 
author of the New Zealand Act himself explain to them the features of 
the arbitration législation. The impact of Mr. Lusk's visit is reflected by 
the subséquent attempt of some State législatures to introduce arbitration 
législation modelled after the New Zealand Act.5 
If the publicity that the New Zealand Arbitration Act received had 
the effect of popularizing in the US the idea of compulsory arbitration, 
it also shewed that the prevailing sentiment was against adopting similar 
compulsory arbitration schemes. Leading this opposition was the NCF. 
Through its pioneering work in conciliation and arbitration during its first 
years of activity, which had resulted in the seulement of hundreds of dis-
putes, the NCF could boast that compulsory arbitration was unnecessary. 6 
At the ideological level, the principle of compulsory arbitration ran 
counter to the ideology underlying the trade agreement, which the NCF 
had been so instrumental in promoting, i.e., the ideology of « harmony 
3 Henry DEMAREST LLOYD, A Country Without Strikes (New York, 1900). 
4 John MITCHELL, Organized Labor (Philadelphie 1903), p. 345. 
5
 U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations, Final Report (Washington D.C., 
1916), Vol. I, pp. 720-1. 
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of interests » between capital and labour. The trade agreement, in fact, 
rested on the assumption that through discussion and joint conférences 
capital and labour would discover their common interest and thereby 
work out a peaceful solution to their dispute. 7 Compulsory arbitration 
implied instead that the two parties were divided by irreconciable inter-
ests, and that the only way to put an end to the dispute was to let an 
impartial third party render a décision which would be binding. 
THE CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES INVESTIGATION ACT OF 1907 
It is on this note of clear rejection that the debate on compulsory 
arbitration soon subsided, undoubtedly pushed to the background by 
more buming issues which characterized the US labour scène from about 
1903 to 1906. Then in 1907 the debate resumed again, when the Canadian 
Parliament passed the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act. The Act 
was occasioned by a prolonged strike in the coal mines of Alberta, which 
threatened the fuel supplies of the prairie Provinces and made the out-
look for the incoming winter a grim one. The most important feature of 
the Act was the provision according to which the parties to a dispute had 
to subject themselves to the investigation of a fact-fmding board before 
taking any strike or lockout action. The board was given 30 days to carry 
out its investigation, and during such time no hostility could be initiated. 
Only after the investigation was concluded and the facts made public, 
could the parties resort to their coercive weapons. Both parties were sub-
jected to penalties should they violate the truce provision. The Act applied 
to public utilities industries and mines (both coal and métal) 8. 
The réponse that this législative measure generated in US industrial 
and labour quarters was much stronger than that produced earlier by 
the New Zealand Act. Partly this was due to the geographical proximity 
6
 On the history and the activities of the National Civic Fédération during 
the Progressive Era see, Marguerite GREEN, The National Civic Fédération and 
the American Labor Movement 1900-1925 (Washington DC, 1956); Gordon JEN-
SEN, « The National Civic Fédération : American Business in an Age of Social 
Change and Social Reform, 1900-1910» (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Prince-
ton University, 1956) ; James WEINSTEIN, The Corporate Idéal in the Libéral 
State (Boston, 1968). 
7 The ideology upon which the trade agreement rested has been analysed at 
some length in Bruno Ramirez, «Le Tensioni Ideologiche nella Storiografia del 
Progressisme Nordamericano », La Critica Sociologica, 23, (Fall 1972), pp. 62-90. 
8 Cf. Labour Gazette, VII, April 1907, pp. 1108-9; U.S. Bureau of Labor, 
Bulletin N. 76, May 1908, pp. 657 ff. 
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of the Canadian industrial situation, which also meant that US-based 
international unions (AF of L affiliâtes) which operated in Canada 
would be directly affected by the Act. More importantly, however, the 
Act had struck one of the notes toward which progressive sentiment 
seemed to be most sensitive — the ideology of public opinion and the 
value it embodied in a démocratie society. The investigation feature of 
the Act would make the notion of public opinion concrète and operative, 
and transform it from an abstract concept into a positive force in favour 
of the 'public interest'. The weight of public opinion would in fact be 
brought by disclosing to the gênerai public the facts which lay beneath 
the dispute. This would act as a major restraining force, especially for 
the party that appeared from the investigation as making the most un-
compromising demand, in that it insured public condamnation should 
this party seek a seulement by resorting to force. The compulsory feature 
of the Act, moreover, appeared in a new light and made the formula 
appealing to many who had found the New Zealand Act much too cons-
training. The Act, in fact, hit a mid-way ground between the two extrêmes 
which up to that point had constituted the two open alternatives : its com-
pulsory feature appeared to be much more moderate than that provided 
for by the New Zealand Act, for it only applied to the period during which 
the investigation was being conducted. On the other hand, this compul-
sory feature was enough to make the Act départ from the 'voluntarist' 
approach that Gompers and the NCF had both preached and practiced 
over the years. 
The appréciation of thèse 'enlightened' traits of the Act became 
soon évident in the first officiai US examination of the Act, done by Dr. 
Victor S. Clark for the U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor9. The 
analysis was based on the first twelve months in which the Act had been 
in opération, and took into account the immédiate responses from various 
sectors of Canadian society. The évaluation was clearly positive. The 
Act was viewed as « the logical first step toward government interven-
tion in labor disputes » 10 ; judging from its first year of opération — the 
Bulletin pointed out — the Act had « accomplished the main purpose 
for which it was enacted, the prévention of strikes and lockouts iin public 
services industries » n . In analysing the Act's most innovative feature — 
9 Victor S. CLARK, « The Canadian Industrial Disputes Investigation Act of 
1907 », U.S. Bureau of Labor, Bulletin No. 76, May 1908, pp. 657-740. 
10 Ibid., p. 657. 
il Ibid., p. 678. 
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i.e., the machinery for compulsory investigation — the author took 
great pain in emphazing the conciliatory dimension of the process as 
against its judicial dimension, thus toning down the élément of compul-
sion underlying the Act. This interprétation was greatly facilitated by 
contrasting the Canadian Act to the New Zealand arbitration act whose 
compulsory aspect was, as already pointed out, quite far-reaching. This 
analysis therefore presented the IDI Act as a most progressive pièce of 
législation which pointed the way to industrial peace, a « hopeful ex-
ample » for the American people which would « prove a guiding star in 
their difficulties » 12. 
REACTIONS FROM LABOUR AND REFORM GROUPS 
If the advocates of the Act were careful to contrast it to the New 
Zealand Act in order to stress the former's moderate character, the oppo-
nents of the Act tended, instead, to lump both Acts together. From the 
'voluntaristic' standpoint Gompers and other AF of L leaders looked at 
the Act, there was not much point drawing fine distinctions between those 
Acts. « As soon as the Government steps in — as Gompers pointed out — 
and says to the workingman... : you must work under such conditions 
as are hère stipulated ; if you do not work you will go to prison. At that 
moment slavery has been introduced... call it by whatever name you 
please, compulsory arbitration or compulsory investigation, compulsory 
work pending the final détermination of that investigation... festablishesl 
the System of slavery... » 13 For Grompers the thirty-day, no-strike order 
— pending the resuit of the investigation — was enough to make the Ca-
nadian Act appear as an infringement of the workers' most sacred right, 
the right to withhold their labour. Hence, the reaction from AF of L 
quarters was immédiate. Gompers' opposition to the Act became one 
of overt belligérance, and he welcomed ail opportunities to denounce it 
as a most oppressive and enslaving pièce of législation. He saw the poten-
tial that the IDI Act might hâve in influencing US public opinion in 
favour of some form of compulsion in the settlement of industrial disputes. 
Gompers' fears were not unfounded. During the 1908-1909 législative 
session two important industrial States, New York and Wisconsin, had 
introduced in their state assemblies bills which embodied provisions 
modelled after the Canadian Act14. Although thèse early attempts did 
12 ma., p. 680. 
13 U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations, op. cit., p. 721. 
14 U.S. Bureau of Labor, Bulletin No. 86, January 1910, p. 21. 
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not go very far, some years later the New York State législature tried 
again to push through a similar bill. This proposed bill became the prin-
cipal topic of discussion at the 13th annual meeting of the NCF's Exe-
cutive Council. Hère Gompers — who was the vice-président of that 
Council — embarked on a pointed speech in which he stressed the danger 
of arbitration schemes such as the Canadian one, and expressed his dé-
termination to fight any measure which would take away from the workers 
their right to strike, under whatever guise it presented itself15. Gompers' 
belligérance toward the IDI Act would intensify through the years as 
other States would contemplate similar législation, and as the State of 
Colorado would actually succeede in passing an industrial disputes law 
which, except for some slight différence, was essentialy a replica of the 
IDI Act16. 
Of the AFL-affiliated unions, the one that became most vocal in 
denouncing the IDI Act was the United Mine Workers Union. This 
seemed obvious since the union was directly affected by the provisions 
of the Act due to the fact that the Alberta and British Columbia coal 
miners were organized by that union. At the 1909 Annual Convention 
of the mine workers union in Indianapolis, the miners adopted a reso-
lution which outrightly condemned the Act. A resolution was also passed 
by the Canadian delegates, advising « . . . our brothers on this side of 
the Une to oppose any such measure of like nature to the utmost of their 
powers » 17. John Mitchell, who after leaving his position as président 
of the UMW remained one of the most influential figures in progressive 
industrial and labour circles, attacked the bill as being ineffective, and 
therefore, useless législation. To Henry Howard — chairman of the Boston 
Chamber of Commerce — who had written to Mitchell expressing in-
terest in the Canadian Act, Mitchell answered pointing out the clearly 
anti-labour character of such a measure. Howard's interest in the Ca-
nadian Act stemmed from the fact that a bill resembling the Canadian 
IDI had been introduced in the Massachusetts législature 18. Few years 
later, when called upon by the US Industrial Relations Commission to 
give his opinion on the merits of the IDI Act, Mitchell called it a « re-
15 Proceedings of the 13th Annual Meeting of the Executive Committee of the 
NCF, January 28, 1913, Box 187(1), National Civic Fédération Papers, New York 
Public Library. 
16 Monthly Review (of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics), I, 6 (Dec. 1915), 
10-12. 
n US Bureau of Labor, Bulletin No. 86, January 1910, p. 15. 
18 John MITCHELL to Henry HOWARD, Feb. 7, 1910, John Mitchell Papers, 
Box 156, The Catholic University of America. 
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pressive System » 19, and « . . . a species of involuntary servitude, which 
is répugnant to the law of the land » 20. 
If US organized labour was united in denouncing the Canadian Act, 
the same cannot be said of the NCF. Although the leading spokesman 
of the Fédération, Ralph Easley, had left no doubts as to his opposition 
to the Canadian law, there remained among the members of the Fédér-
ation a certain amount of ambiguity as to the feature of the Act. This 
was due in part to the fact that many of the NCF's executive council 
members were employers who obviously looked at the Canadian Act 
from quite a différent angle. A leading example was Marcus Marks. As 
président of the National Association of Clothiers, he had been a leading 
member of the Fédération for many years, and enjoyed a high réputation 
in industrial circles on account of his repeated services as mediator and 
conciliator for the Federation's Conciliation Department. The historian 
of the Fédération calls him « the star mediator » 21. Besides his practical 
knowledge of that field growing from his involvement in hundreds of 
disputes, he was also a keen student of the subject. His response to the 
IDI Act was enthusiastic. He wrote Easley that he was « impressed with 
it > 22, and took a particular interest in the measure, spending a great deal 
of time travelling throughout Canada, talking with arbitrators, labour 
leaders, employers and politicians. He soon became convinced that the 
Canadian Act pointed the way toward a peaceful solution of the industrial 
problem and firmly believed — as he told a NCF audience — that 
« . . . the principles of that Act [could] be introduced into our States » 23. 
He gave wide publicity to the principles of the Canadian Act in various 
articles which he wrote through the years. One such article appeared 
in the Independent in 1910, and was later put into pamphlet form and 
widely circulated 24. The article aroused the wrath of Gompers not only 
for the position Marks took in regard to the IDI Act but also for the 
position he took on the thorny topic of the open versus closed shop. 
Gompers decided to call this whole issue to the attention of the labour 
public by reproducing the article in the American Federationist and by 
19
 U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations, op. cit., p. 421. 
20 ibid., p. 422. 
21 Marguerite GREEN, op. cit., p. 300. 
22 Marcus M. MARKS to Ralph EASLEY, Jan. 22, 1912, Box 79a, NCF 
Papers. 
23 Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the National Civic Fédér-
ation, New York, lanuary 12 to 14, 1911 (New York, 1911), p. 283. 
24 Marcus M. MARKS, « The Employer and the Labor Union >, Independent, 
LXVIII (May 26, 1910), pp. 1112-1115. 
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refuting its arguments. Referring to the principle of compulsory investi-
gation which Marks had advocated, Gompers pointed out that the prin-
ciple was « . . . répugnant not only to that provision of the Constitution 
which guarantees that no man shall be kept in involuntary servitude 
except as a punishment of crime, but [was] at variance with every concept 
of liberty and progress » 25. Another exchange between the two men took 
place again in the February issue of the AF of L paper, in which Marks 
reaffirmed his belief in the principle of compulsory investigation26, and 
Gompers proceeded again in refuting it as being contrary to the interests 
of organized labour and useless as far as unorganized workingmen were 
concerned 27. One can see how, on account of the position of prominence 
that both Gompers and Marks occupied in industrial circles and in the 
NCF's high councils, such a controversy could hâve very well produced 
a serious crisis in the National Civic Fédération. However, Easley inter-
vened promptly and with his notorious diplomatie skills was able to 
defuse the tension between the two men. If the issue seemed to be settled 
in the short run, it is very likely that the controversy had a crucial rôle 
in strenghtening the feelings of antagonism toward the NQF which had 
been mounting in récent years in large strata of the AF of L membership, 
and which was to erupt during the United Mine Workers annual con-
vention of 1911, when John Mitchell was forced to sever his affiliation 
with the NCF, and at the AF of L National Convention that same year, 
where a resolution forbidding AF of L members to maintain membership 
in the NCF was barely defeated. 
That the IDI Act became a subject of major controversy within the 
NCF is also witnessed by the repeated times in which the Act was hotly 
debated during NCF-sponsored conférences. One such debate took place 
in occasion of the Federation's annual convention in January 1911, at 
which time a whole session was devoted to the subject of 'Industrial 
Peace'. NCF Président Seth Low hoped that session would become a 
testing ground for some amendments he had worked out to the New 
York State industrial disputes law, in the hope that the new law would 
25 Samuel GOMPERS, « Labor's Différences with Mr. Marcus M. Marks 
et Al.», American Federationist, XVII (October, 1910), p. 884. 
2 6
 « Isn't wiser —Marks replied to Gompers— to investigate while the men 
are earning wages, the company doing business and the public being accomodated 
rather than take up thèse questions after a strike has been declared »? — a state-
ment which sums up the feeling of many employers toward the Canadian Act ; 
American Federationist, XVIII, (February 1911), p. 109. 
27 ibid., p. 110. 
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become a model for other states, thereby generating uniformity while 
at the same time extending the principle of the Erdman Act (voluntary 
arbitration in inter-state railroads) to disputes involving public service 
corporations 28. Instead, most of the discussion revolved around the sig-
nificance of the Canadian IDI Act and most of the speakers pointed to 
it as a possible solution to the problem of industrial disputes in the U.S. 
For Cornélius J. Doyle —Chairman of the Illinois State Board of Arbi-
tration— the principle of compulsory investigation upon which the IDI 
was founded was « . . . a désirable clause to be inserted into the arbi-
tration laws of every State ». 29 He pointed out that that principle grew out 
of the appréciation of the value of enlightened public opinion, and felt 
that « publicity [was] the strongest weapon that can be used for the 
maintenance of industrial peace ».30 According to Edward W. Frost 
—Wisconsin Labor Commissioner, and fervent admirer of the « brilliant 
young Canadian stateman » Mackenzie King— in the Canadian System 
of arbitration « . . . there lay the way toward industrial peace ».31 Frost 
warned the audience that « unless labor and capital stand shoulder to 
shoulder for some such principle as that, there are very much graver 
danger ahead of us, and there is the danger of such an uprising of public 
opinion as will lead us into new ends and into new measures for the 
solution of this problem ».32 Seth Low's position toward the Canadian 
Act — forced by the course the debate had taken — was quite ambiguous 
and reflected the contradictory nature of the NCF's activities, namely, 
having to pursue the interest of capital while at the same time trying not 
to alienate its labour members. Actually, it would be more correct to say 
that Low avoided taking any position. He admitted that the IDI Act 
« seems to work fairly well in Canada », but felt that the Act should be 
dismissed from considération « at the présent time », because he thought 
it unlikely that similar législation could be adopted in the U.S. on account 
of the strong opposition from organized labour33. 
The pro-IDI Act statement of Doyle and Frost, mentioned above, 
did not necessarily reflect the opinion of ail government arbitrators ; they 
nevertheless indicate the degree of support the IDI Act was gaining among 
this important class of professional arbitrators, especially at a time when 
28 NCF Proceedings, 1911, op. cit., p . 267. 
29 Ibid., p. 257. 
30 ibid., p . 258. 
31 Ibid., p. 250. 
32 Ibid., p . 250. 
33 Ibid., p. 266. 
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agitation among the profession was mounting because of the limitations 
of state boards to deal with industrial disputes of an inter-state character. 
This agitation had been set off by the long and bitter strike of the seamen 
on the Great Lakes in the summer of 1909, when the Médiation and Arbi-
tration Boards of six states bordering on the lakes had been prevented 
from dealing effectively in a concerted way with that crisis on account 
of the diverse powers given by law to those Boards34. In this context, 
no few state arbitrators saw in the compulsory investigation feature of 
the Canadian IDI Act the principle which would provide uniformity in 
the various state arbitration laws. 
THE IDI ACT AND THE US COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
The centrality of the IDI Act in the minds of US industrial relations 
experts became strickingly apparent in the work of the U.S. Commission 
on Industrial Relations35. When in 1914 the Commission set out to 
carry out its massive work of investigating the industrial conditions, 
touring the whole country and interviewing hundreds of employers, labour 
leaders, government officiais, and académies, the Canadian Act was 
one of the main items on the agenda, and repeatedly the Commission 
members brought it into the discussion in an attempt to ascertain the 
reaction of the American public, as well as to assess the merits of the 
Act in practice. The highlight came when the author himself of the IDI, 
Mackenzie King, appeared before the commission to testify, and was 
subjected to extensive questioning especially by the commissioners rep-
resenting labour. Ail the arguments against the Act which had emerged 
since its enactement were presented to King, and he proceeded with great 
argumentative skill to réfute them one by one. One of the main charges 
against the Act had been that of portraying it as a « law against strikes 
and lockouts >.36 As previously pointed out, American opponents of the 
Act had often neglected to differentiate it from the compulsory arbitration 
provision of the Australasian Acts. King took great pains to point out 
the différence and show the characteristic features of the IDI Act in 
order to prove that the accusation was unfounded. If labour was sincère 
34 Bulletin of the New York State Department of Labor, June 1909, pp. 132-
158. 
35 For a thorough analysis of the history and the activities of the US Com-
mission on Industrial Relations in the context of progressive politics, sec Graham 
ADAMS, Jr., The Age of Industrial Conflict (New York, 1966), and James 
WEINSTEIN, op. cit., pp. 172-213. 
36 U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations, op. cit., vol. IX, p. 8834. 
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in its claim that the strike weapon was the very last resort — King argued 
— now the Canadian government had provided some machinery whereby 
the State would assume ail the expenses of investigating industrial dis-
putes. Therefore the Canadian Act — King pointed out — was « tak[ing] 
away no right from labor that it desires to hâve ».37 Instead, it had 
provided « one other means of obtaining justice » for the working people. 
King then proceeded to défend the Act from the allégation that it had 
been a failure in Canada. This allégation had been repeatedly used by 
US labour leaders who opposed the Act ; they pointed to the various 
occasions when large numbers of striking workers had violated the Act 
without incurring any penalties, due to the sheer impossibility of prose-
cuting several thousands of striking workers. King's answer was that under 
the Act the government was not so much concerned in initiating prose-
cutions, as it was concerned in trying to render a service to the com-
munity. The Act assumed that both parties were sincère in allowing the 
machinery of the State to bring out the facts with a view to reaching a 
just settlement. Both organized labour and organized capital had ex-
pressed their willingness to this effect. « The penalty feature of the Act » 
— King thus concluded — « had to be regarded as « quite a secondary 
feature » 38. 
Although this emphasis on the conciliatory, rather than on the ju-
dicial, aspect of the Act was intended by King to tone down the élément 
of compulsion contained in the Act, King was finally forced to admit 
that compulsion was indeed one of the characteristic features of the légis-
lation. He went on discussing the principle of compulsion which in effect 
underlie the whole philosophy of the Act. The principle of law and order 
— so essential if the State had to insure social justice — made it neces-
sary to give up a certain amount of one's rights for the good of society 
as a whole. Therefore, both capital and labour had to surrender their rights 
to society 39. But this restraint was necessary in order to « gain a wider 
measure of liberty from and for society as a whole ». ^  In the long run, 
the Act was providing an extension of the bounds of liberty of labour 
rather than a restriction. 
In an earlier appearance before the Commission, King had been 
forced to discuss the political significance that the compulsory investi-
37 ibid., pp. 8834-35. 
38 ibid., p. 8842. 
39 ibid., p. 8843. 
40 ibid. 
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gation législation had taken on in Canada in relation to the labour-capital 
conflict. King had admitted that the penalty provision was aimied pri-
marily at insuring « continuous opération of the utility.. . concerned », 
and that this had been a sort of « understanding » between the State and 
the employers41. In exchange for this concession, labour had in turn 
been given a concession also, namely, « the right to hâve their own mem-
ber on a board » 42. This admission that King made to the US Industrial 
Relations commissioners is, of course, of vast historical importance. It 
dissolves the intricate ideological verbiage which he so masterfully put 
forth to the commissioners as an apologia of the IDI Act, and points 
to the actual political bargaining surrounding the enactement of that 
labour législation. It also provides the key to gaining a clearer historical 
understanding as to why the compulsory investigation provision had 
met the support of a whole sector of the Canadian labour bureaucracy 
when such a provision would instead meet the outright opposition of 
US organized labour, and become branded as anti-labour législation43. 
When the Commission completed its investigations, the final reports 
it issued reflected the degree of division existing among its members in 
regard to the principle of compulsory investigation which the Canadian 
Act had popularized throughout the past few years. The report presented 
by the three représentatives of labour and by the commission's chairman, 
Frank Walsh, rejected outrightly the principle of compulsory investigation, 
and recommended the création of national boards of médiation and inves-
tigation, independent from the Department of Labor, where investigation 
would be carried out on a purely voluntary basis 44. The opposite position 
was taken by the three représentatives of capital, who in a dissenting report 
recommended the adoption of compulsory investigation in public utility 
industries to be carried out by Industrial Commissions which would be 
created for that express purpose 45. Between thèse two opposite positions 
was economist John Commons' report, which received the partial sup-
port of the three représentatives of capital. In his report Commons dealt 
41
 U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 716. 
42 Ibid. 
43
 KING told the commissioners, with a certain amount of pride, thaï « . . . the 
leading officers in the labor organizations at that time were not opposed to [the lé-
gislation] », and that in particular « . . the Trades' Labor Congress of the Dominion 
indorsed it». Ibid., p. 716. On the immédiate reaction from the Canadian Labor 
movement, cf. also Victor S. CLARK, op. cit., Bulletin N. 76, pp. 672 ff. 
4 4
 U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations, op. cit., pp. 120-124. 
45 Ibid., p. 233. 
554 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 29, NO 3 
at great lenght with the Canadian Act. He commended it for having made 
capital and labour sensitive to the great value of public inquiry by ele-
vating the principle of investigation — a principle which Commons had 
carefully studied over the years and which had become central to his 
theory of industrial democracy46. For Commons, however, investigation 
was a technical-scientifïc process rather than a strictly political one — 
something the government had to provide freely and which organized 
capital and labour could avail themselves of whenever the need arose 47. 
Its great value, therefore, lay not in the fact that it allowed for govern-
ment intervention in the process of industrial conflict, but rather, that 
it provided the necessary technical machinery which made it possible 
to ascertain the causes of the industrial disturbance, thus enabling the 
parties to arrive at a mutually satisfactory seulement. The moment the 
government would try to administer it on a compulsory basis, investigation 
ceased being a technical-scientific process, and would become a political 
problem. Compulsion would, in fact, vitiate the process of fact-finding 
and would hâve the effect of upsetting in favour of one of the two parties 
the délicate balance of power which, in Commons' view, was essential 
for the success of the collective bargaining process. Commons' report, 
thus, recommended the adoption of « a voluntary board of investigation, 
adapted from the Canadian Act but without its compulsory feature > 48. 
Soon the Commission disbanded, its massive findings became nothing 
more than source material for industrial scholars, and its recommenda-
tions fell on deaf ears. However, throughout its search for a solution 
to the problem of industrial conflict, the IDI Act had been a constant 
référence point and a base for analysis and expérimentation. More im-
portantly, the Commission had also served to cristallize the division of 
opinion existing in the US in regard to compulsory investigation ; it had 
made clear that the principle served primarily the interest of capital and 
that it worked against the interest of organized labour. 
THE RAILROAD CRISIS OF 1916 AND THE DEFEAT OF 
COMPULSORY INVESTIGATION 
Only few months had passed that the debate over compulsory rég-
ulation of industrial disputes became the center of industrial and political 
46 ibid., p. 210. 
47 Bruno RAMIREZ, « Collective Bargaining and the Progressive Era : The 
Contribution of John Commons and Samuel Gompers» (mimiogr., Toronto 1970). 
48 U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations, op. cit., p. 210. 
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affairs. Late in the summer 1916 the four railroad Brotherhoods threat-
ened a nation-wide strike which, if actually called, would hâve paralyzed 
the country. What is more significant is the fact that the Brotherhoods 
had grown dissatisfied with the arbitration machinery (voluntary investi-
gation) provided by the Newlands Act to settle disputes in the railroads. 
In their demands for the eight hours and for wage increases they had 
no intention to submit to arbitration. It became évident that some new 
législation had to be enacted if a period of major économie chaos was 
going to be averted in the country. 
It was in the midst of this feeling of impending industrial and labour 
crisis that the compulsory investigation and arbitration features began 
to be viewed again in many quarters as possible solutions. This became 
the object of serious considération in organizations such as the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, and the American Academy of Political Science. 
In the case of the latter organization, support of comuulsory arbitration 
was total. Easley, who had met privately with DR. Samuel McCune Lind-
say — président of the Academy — found out to his great dismay that 
among the members of the Academy there was « not a man who is against 
compulsory arbitration . . . they are ail for it » 49. The issue generated 
enormous tension among the NCF executive council members. This 
climate of tension characterized the October 23 emergency meeting which 
the executive council of the Fédération called to discuss the subject. Once 
again Gompers used the occasion to denounce ail forms of compulsory 
government intervention in industrial matters, but this time he got a cold 
réception among some prominent members such as August Belrnont and 
economist B. Seligman. They were beginning to display clear signs of 
annoiance with Grompers' intransigence on the matter. In their view, this 
was no time for rigidity. The situation demanded a careful assessment 
of the limitations that the présent machinery embodied, and a search for 
some alternative which would preclude the enactement of more extrême 
measures50. In reality, thèse objections were going right to the heart of 
Gompers' philosophy of 'voluntarism'. That the labour impasse was 
about to precipitate a crisis in the NCF can also be seen by Easley's res-
ponse to the situation. He had to admit that the labour crisis had raised 
the ail-important question as to whether « . . . collective bargaining 
point[ed] the way out ». As he wrote to a leading railroad président : 
49
 Proceedings of the Executive Council Meeting of the National Civic Fédér-
ation, October 23, 1916; Box 189, NCF Fapers., p. 8. 
50 ibid. 
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« if the most intelligent unions and the largest capitalists, under a model 
collective agreement, can reach a stage where one has the power to say 
to the other — and says it — « unless you yield, we will destroy you », 
then those employers who oppose collective bargaining hâve had placed 
in their hands a very formidable weapon ».51 
As the debate on compulsory régulation of industrial disputes inten-
sified, the features of the Canadian IDI Act were increasingly emerging 
in the minds of many as constituting the proper formula for the solution 
of the problem at hand. Easley was very well aware of this, and he tried 
disperately to influence public opinion against the Canadian Act. In an 
article which very tactically he entitled « The Canadian Compulsory In-
vestigation Act », and which appeared in several publications, he set out 
again to analyse the Act and to show how it had failed in its objectives. 
To the growing number of people who were asking themselves whether 
the Canadian Act would not solve the crisis situation in the railroads, 
Easley was proving that it did not hold « any promise as a way out to the 
United States » ». 
The sentiment in favour of the Canadian Act reached a climax point 
when it became known that Président Wilson had given very careful con-
sidération to it, and that he was attempting to fonnulate a plan « . . . having 
in mind the Canadian Investigation Act ».53 But the overwhelming op-
position from organized labour to such a plan54, the détermination of 
the Brotherhoods that the eight-hour day was a non-negotiable demand, 
and the worsening of the crisis on the international front, forced Wilson 
to accède to the Brotherhoods demands by passing what became known 
as the Adamson Act, therefore averting a major économie and political 
paralysis 55. 
Président Wilson's serious intentions to enact arbitration législation 
modelled after the IDI Act marks the high point of influence that the 
51 Ralph EASLEY to Vincent ASTOR, Sept. 12, 1916 ; Box 188, NCF Papers ; 
letters similar in tone were sent to other prominent railroad présidents. 
52 Copy of the article in Box 76, Mitchell Papers. 
53 NCF Proceedings, Oct. 23, 1916, op. cit., p . 4. 
54 See GOMPERS's editorial « Freedom must not be surrended », American 
Federationist, XXIV (Jan. 1917), pp. 45-46.; The opposition of the railroad brother-
hoods to compulsory investigation was well articulated by Austin B. GARRETSON, 
«The Attitude of Organized Labor Toward the Canadian Industrial Disputes In-
vestigation Ac t» , Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
XVI (Jan. 1917), pp. 170-72. 
55 « R.R. Workers Win Eight Hours », American Federationist, XXIV (Apr. 
1917), 282-4. 
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Canadian Act exerted on the US industrial and political establishment. 
Undoubtedly, the situation of crisis surrounding Wilson's design made 
the Canadian formula appear as a ready solution to the impending in-
dustrial chaos. Nevertheless, the décision was the culmination of nearly 
a décade of intense debate, during which ail the pros and cons of the 
IDI formula had been carefully scrutinized and argued, with its advocates 
and opponents taking sides. 
The war not only put an end to this debate, but it also prevented 
the debate from transforming itself into an all-out power confrontation 
between organized labor and the employers-government front. The Adam-
son Act was not only the railroad Brotherhoods' historié victory over 
the eight-hour demand. It was the victory of US organized labour over 
the principle of compulsory investigation ; a victory that shows not only 
the objective position of power of US labour at that particular historical 
juncture, but also the wider political significance that an industrial rela-
tions formula such as compulsory investigation acquired in the context 
of the capital-labour conflict in the U.S. 
La réaction américaine à la Loi canadienne des enquêtes 
en matière de différends industriels 
La croissance rapide du syndicalisme qui a suivi une crise économique grave 
aux États-Unis entre 1893 et 1896, tout comme l'augmentation des grèves qui l'ont 
accompagnée, portèrent au premier plan la question de l'arbitrage des conflits 
industriels. L'arbitrage devait-il être volontaire ou obligatoire ? Ce sujet devait 
rester d'actualité pendant toute la durée de l'Ère du Progrès alors que divers groupe-
ments et organisations réformistes essayèrent de trouver une solution pratique au 
«problème ouvrier». C'est dans ce contexte historique que l'article ci-dessus analyse 
les répercussions de la Loi des enquêtes en matière de différends industriels (Loi 
Lemieux) aux États-Unis. L'article tente aussi de montrer dans quelle mesure la 
question de l'arbitrage a eu tendance à déborder les frontières strictes des relations 
professionnelles pour prendre une véritable signification politique. 
Au tournant du siècle, le New Zeeland Arbitration Act (Loi d'arbitrage de 
la Nouvelle-Zélande) avait soulevé beaucoup d'intérêt et reçu énormément de pu-
blicité aux États-Unis. Cette loi était le premier exemple d'une législation imposant 
l'arbitrage obligatoire et exécutoire aux deux parties dans un différend du travail. 
La controverse qu'elle suscita montra cependant que l'opposition à cette forme 
d'arbitrage était le sentiment prédominant. Cette opposition provenait, non seule-
ment du mouvement syndical, mais aussi de l'influente National Civic Fédération 
(Fédération nationale des droits civils), une organisation à caractère national, où 
étaient représentés les syndicats, les hommes d'affaires et le public, et qui joua 
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un rôle considérable dans l'établissement de la politique en matière de relations 
professionnelles pendant toute la durée de cette période d'expansion économique. 
Le débat reprit de nouveau lorsque, en 1907, le Parlement canadien adopta la 
Loi des enquêtes en matière de différends industriels (Loi Lemieux). L'intérêt im-
mense que cette loi produisit aux États-Unis était d'abord attribuable au fait qu'elle 
imposait aux parties un mécanisme d'enquête. En réalité, la Loi avait touché un 
des points auxquels le mouvement progressif était le plus sensible, c'est-à-dire à 
l'idéologie de la toute-puissance de l'opinion publique et de la valeur incompa-
rable de la société démocratique. L'accent mis sur l'idée d'enquête qu'on trouvait 
énoncée dans la Loi concrétisait et rendait effective la notion d'opinion publique. 
D'un concept abstrait, elle faisait une force positive favorisant ce qu'on appelait 
« l'intérêt public». 
Pendant que le mouvement syndical trouvait inacceptable ce mécanisme d'enquête 
obligatoire et qu'il s'opposait avec vigueur à cette législation, la Loi obtenait, au 
contraire, la faveur des milieux gouvernementaux tant au niveau du fédéral que des 
États. Les principaux États fortement industrialisés, tels que les États de New 
York et du Wisconsin, présentèrent des projets de loi qui renfermaient des dispo-
sitions s'inspirant de la Loi canadienne ; d'autres États projetaient de faire la même 
chose. En 1914, le Colorado réussit à faire adopter une loi des différends du travail 
qui, sauf en de légères variantes, était une réplique de la Loi des enquêtes en matière 
de différends industriels. Aussi, parmi un grand nombre de médiateurs des gou-
vernements, la Loi reçut-elle un accueil favorable, sinon enthousiaste. La réaction 
des milieux réformistes était, au contraire, partagée. Ceci était surtout visible à 
l'intérieur de la National Civic Fédération où un désaccord violent entre les repré-
sentants du travail et les représentants du monde des affaires engendra une longue 
et ardente controverse qui, à certains moments, fut la cause de crises graves dans 
l'organisation. 
L'influence de la Loi des enquêtes en matière de différends industriels se re-
fléta aussi dans les travaux de VU.S. Commission of Industrial Relations en 1914 
et en 1915. Créée en vue de faire enquête sur les conditions de la vie industrielle 
et de proposer des recommandations législatives sur un grand nombre de questions 
en matière de législation du travail, la Commission attira l'attention sur la Loi 
canadienne afin de se rendre compte de la réaction du public américain et d'en 
apprécier la valeur pratique. Le rapport final de la Commission laisse voir une 
polarisation certaine des opinions en faveur du principe de l'enquête obligatoire, 
à l'exception des représentants syndicaux qui la rejetaient et des représentants patro-
naux qui la recommandaient dans les entreprises de service public. Par contre, 
l'éminent économiste du travail, John Commons, qui était un membre important 
de la Commission, adopta une voie médiane. Il trouva que le principe de l'enquête 
avait une grande valeur et recommanda l'adoption d'une « commission d'enquête 
volontaire, qui consisterait dans une adaptation de la Loi canadienne, mais dénuée 
de tout caractère obligatoire ». 
Dans les mois suivants, le débat prit une tournure fort dramatique, alors que, 
à l'été de 1916, les quatre fraternités de cheminots menacèrent de déclencher une 
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grève nationale qui, si elle avait eu lieu, aurait paralysé le pays. C'est pendant 
cette crise industrielle et ouvrière imminente que les dispositions caractéristiques 
de la Loi des enquêtes en matière de différends industriels furent envisagées en plu-
sieurs milieux comme une solution possible. C'est à ce moment que les stipulations 
de la Loi canadienne vinrent le plus près d'être incorporées dans la législation amé-
ricaine du travail au niveau fédéral, alors que le président Wilson et son cabinet 
cherchèrent à appliquer une formule « en ayant à l'esprit la Loi canadienne des 
enquêtes en matière de différends industriels». Cependant, l'opposition irrésistible 
du mouvement syndical et l'aggravation de la situation internationale forcèrent 
Wilson à céder aux exigences des fraternités en adoptant ce qui est devenu VAdam-
son Act. Non seulement la guerre mit-elle fin à cette controverse, mais elle l'em-
pêcha de dégénérer en une bataille à finir entre le mouvement syndical et le front 
uni du gouvernement et des employeurs. 
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